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COMMENT ON "ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DIMENSIONS"
THOMAS I. EMERSON*
I agree with Bruce Fein's position that "[p]reservation of the
Nation's democracy depends in large measure on access by the
public to information regarding government practices or policies." 1
The crucial role played by the citizen's right of access to informa-
tion is apparent if we simply stop to think for a moment what the
difference between citizen knowledge and citizen ignorance would
make upon the course of history. Suppose that the information
embodied in the Pentagon Papers had been made available to the
public at the time. Is there any doubt that the Viet Nam War
would have ended long before it did? Or suppose that the FBI's
harassment of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had been revealed to
the citizens of this country when it was occurring. Would anyone
believe that it would have continued beyond the moment of dis-
closure? Or would the CIA's assistance in mining the waters of
Nicaraguan ports ever have taken place if the information about
plans to engage in that operations had been public knowledge?
Thus, on the importance of the citizen's unimpeded access to in-
formation I am in full accord with Mr. Fein.
Conversely, in my judgment, Mr. Fein's paper overstates the
case for our system of classification and gives too little weight to
the public's right to know. Some secrecy in some operations of the
government is, of course, necessary. But the strong presumption
should be against government secrecy. In a democratic society
withholding information from the public should bear a heavy bur-
den of justification. Nondisclosure should be confined to a narrow
area roughly limited to tactical military operations, design of weap-
ons, and those aspects of diplomatic relations when confidentiality
in the negotiation process is expected by all parties.
* Lines Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School.
1. Fein, Access to Classified Information: Constitutional and Statutory Dimensions, 26
WM. & MARY L. REv. 805 (1985).
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If we start with these assumptions, as I think we should, there
are at least five points at which Mr. Fein's position fails to measure
up to the requirements of a democratic system. First, Mr. Fein
largely ignores the background against which the judgment to con-
ceal information from the public must be made. When we base our
decision to classify on relevance to "national security" we are deal-
ing with a concept of enormous ambiguity. The term "national se-
curity" is virtually without limitation. It could embrace almost any
aspect of our national life. Moreover, past experience demonstrates
that the classification process is grossly overused and frequently
abused. Millions of documents are routinely stamped classified, a
high proportion of which cannot be justified on any theory of harm
to national security. At times the classification symbols are used to
cover up incompetence, mistakes, or even corruption. In addition,
experience has also shown that, as in the Pentagon Papers2 case,
government claims of harm to national security are highly exagger-
ated and must be viewed with the utmost skepticism. Finally, the
classification system is permeated with leaks. A significant propor-
tion of information reaching the public through the press and
other sources is actually in violation of the classification rules.
In formulating the principles for shutting off the public's access
to government information these and similar factors must be taken
into account. A fool-proof, iron-clad system of government secrecy
smacks more of a totalitarian than a democratic system.
Second, Mr. Fein underestimates the force of the precept that,
under the first amendment, the press and the public have a consti-
tutional right to know. Mr. Fein argues that "[g]enerally [speak-
ing], neither the public nor the media enjoy any constitutional
right of access to information or records generated or controlled by
the government,"'3 citing only the Houchins4 case. He goes on to
say that the Supreme Court "has recognized only one exception to
the 'no access' rule,' '5 that being the right of access to criminal tri-
als upheld in the Richmond Newspapers6 case. I think it clear that
the right-to-know principle carries much more weight than Mr.
2. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
3. See Fein, supra note 1, at 819.
4. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
5. See Fein, supra note 1, at 820.
6. Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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Fein acknowledges. The first amendment theory from which the
doctrine springs-that the people as sovereign need to be kept in-
formed of all matters affecting the public interest-is a powerful
one. It goes to the essence of democratic government. And I believe
the Supreme Court will, over time, give the right-to-know a greater
role in first amendment adjudication than it has in the past. I
would think, for example, that a strong case can be made for the
proposition that the right of the press to report first-hand on the
invasion of Grenada, apart from matters of military tactics that
would endanger our armed forces, is constitutionally guaranteed
under right-to-know principles.
Third, Mr. Fein downgrades the power and the competency of
the judicial branch of government to play a significant part in
checking abuses of the classification system by the executive
branch. He goes as far as to argue that claims by the Executive to
withhold information from Congress on grounds of executive privi-
lege ought to be considered "political questions," and thereby not
within the jurisdiction of the courts. It is quite true that any sys-
tem of secrecy is difficult to hold in check; the very process of su-
pervision involves sharing the secrets with others. Yet this does not
mean that the search for checks and balances must be abandoned.
On the contrary the courts, through devices such as proceeding in
camera, and the legislature, through measures such as the Classi-
fied Information Protection Act, already have begun the search for
methods by which more effective supervision of secrecy claims can
be effectuated.
Fourth, there has been a strong tendency on the part of the gov-
ernment to press toward the goal of creating and maintaining a
precision-like system in which vast amounts of information will be
classified and no leaks will be permitted. Thus, the President in
March 1983 issued a Directive which would have required some
100,000 government employees to sign pre-publication agreements,
under which for the rest of their lives they could not publish any
material, classified or unclassified, which dealt with matters arising
in the course of their government employment, unless they first
obtained clearance from their former agencies. The same directive
called for increased use of polygraph tests and FBI investigators to
police the system. As a result of objections from Congress and
others these measures have not yet been put into effect, but there
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is no assurance that they will not be. Meanwhile the Department
of Justice, in the case of Samuel Loring Morison,' is attempting to
persuade the courts to interpret the espionage laws as applying to
the transmission of classified information to the press. And the
CIA has been preparing to ask Congress for legislation to make it a
criminal offense for government employees to disclose classified
information.
Mr. Fein's paper appears to support this draconian approach.
Thus, he endorses the Supreme Court decisions in Marchetti8 and
Snepp,9 upholding CIA prepublication agreements, and indeed as-
sumes that these decisions are applicable throughout the govern-
ment, even though they concerned only the CIA. In my judgment
the effort to tighten up the classification system in this way poses a
serious threat to the democratic way of life in this country. So
much material is classified, access to classified material is so essen-
tial to the decisionmaking process, the actual harm to national se-
curity from improper disclosures so unproven, that only a rela-
tively loose system for keeping government secrets will prevent us
from ending up as a virtually closed society.
Fifth, the same considerations apply to laws and government
machinery designed to control the dissemination of classified infor-
mation which has already escaped the government's grasp. Mr.
Fein accepts Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in the Pentagon
Papers case as laying down the applicable rule of law. According to
this doctrine, the government can enjoin the publication of classi-
fied information when its disclosure would "surely result in direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people."
There are serious drawbacks to the Stewart formula: it is exceed-
ingly vague, giving little advance notice of what the law is; it ac-
cords no weight to the social and individual interests in freedom of
expression, considering only the alleged harm to national security;
it violates the rule against prior restraint. Moreover, if a similar
principle is embodied in legislation establishing a criminal prosecu-
tion for divulging classified information, the result is the creation
of an "official secrets act," attaching a criminal penalty to the cir-
7. United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md. 1985).
8. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
9. Snepp. v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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culation of a particular piece of information by anybody under cir-
cumstances where publication could be deemed to harm national
security.
It would seem clear to me that the opportunity to obtain infor-
mation necessary to the discussion of public issues on a knowledge-
able and intelligent basis would not exist under these formulations
of the law. Rather, our efforts should be directed toward marking
out specified categories of information, such as that involving tacti-
cal military operations, where the right to communicate informa-
tion could legitimately be restricted.
In summary, I would say that our present rules on classification
play a profoundly inhibiting role in our system of freedom of ex-
pression, one that is growing more restrictive day by day. Our ef-
forts should be directed, not toward expanding the structure or
making it more effective, but toward focusing its restrictions on a
specified narrow area and loosening up its administration.
